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Kraut: Stone v. Williams 970 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1992)
Accordingly, the Appellate Court analyzed the
nature of Goodman's actions between 1968 and 1973
and not his intent. The court reasoned that
Goodman's lawsuit was not merely one against an
infringing user. He also sought recovery of royalties,
an injunction to force compliance with the management contract and a declaration of sole ownership.
Thus, in addition to seeking sole ownership,
Goodman also sought to continue his use of the trade
name by continuing to perform his managerial duties.
Therefore, the lawsuit satisfied the Silverman use
requirement and Goodman did not abandon the trade
name. It was then unnecessary for the court to consider the second prong of the Silverman test regarding whether Goodman intended to resume use of the
trade name in the reasonably foreseeable future.

CONCLUSION
In finding Goodman did not abandon his ownership rights to the trade name "The Diamonds", the
Second Circuit expanded the Silverman standard. By
recognizing that use of a trade name depends on the
occupation of the owner, the court allowed for the
present situation in which, due to Goodman's occupation as band manager, litigation became his only
means of using the trade name and avoiding an abandonment claim. Moreover, since such a lawsuit must
be targeted at promoting the use of the name in commerce rather than simply prohibiting its use by another, this expansion adhered to the underlying policy in
Silverman that an owner must maintain a trade name
as an economically viable asset or otherwise risk forfeiting it.

Ann E. Dustman
1. Stetson v. Wolf & Assocs., 955 F.2d 847, 850 (2nd Cir.
1992) (citing Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 45-46 (2nd. Cir.
1989)).
2. Id. at 849.
3. See Id. at 851; see also 15 U.S.C. S 1127 (Supp. 1992).
4. 955 F.2d at 850 (citing Silverman, 870 F.2d at 45).
5. Silverman involved a dispute over the use of popular
radio and television characters where the plaintiff wanted to use
the characters as a basis for his play and CBS held the trademark
and copyrights but discontinued broadcasting the shows in
response to criticism from civil rights groups. See, 955 F.2d at 851
(citing Silverman, 870 F.2d at 47-48); See also 15 U.S.C.A. S 1127
(West Supp. 1992) (defining abandonment of trade name).
6. 955 F.2d at 851 (citing Silverman, 870 F.2d at 47-48).
7. See Id. at 851-52.

Stone v. Williams,
970 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1992).
INTRODUCTION
Cathy Stone ("Stone"), the illegitimate daughter of
the late Hank Williams sued Hank Williams Jr. and

others for past royalties based on her claimed copyright renewal interest. Stone claimed she was the
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child of Williams within the meaning of sections 24
and 304(a) of the Copyright Act. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Stone was
entitled to a share of the copyright renewals under
both the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act
of 1976, because under state law she was included in
the definition of a child entitled to inherit.
FACTS
Stone is the illegitimate daughter of the late Hank
Williams, the famous country and western composer
and performer. The defendants are Hank Williams, Jr.,
the son of Hank Williams, Billie Jean Williams Berlin,
the widow of Hank Williams, and assignees of certain
of their interests, including assignees of their interest
in the renewal copyrights.
On October, 17, 1979, Stone was told by her
adoptive mother that she may be Hank Williams'
daughter. On September 12, 1985 Stone filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York seeking a declaration that she
was Williams' child within the meaning of sections 24
and 304(a) of the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976
and entitled to a property interest in the copyright
renewals for Williams songs.'
In the meantime, the defendants sued in Alabama
state court, seeking a declaration that Stone was
barred from demonstrating that she was the natural
child of Williams entitled to a share of his estate.
Recognizing the trial court's decision that Stone was
the natural child of Williams, the Alabama Supreme
Court found her entitled to a share of the proceeds of
Williams' estate.' After the Alabama Supreme Court
decision, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that Stone's action for renewal copyrights was barred by the Copyright Acts' three year
statute of limitations.' Stone appealed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Stone claimed that as the child of Williams she is
entitled to an interest in the renewal copyrights of his
songs and royalty payments. On appeal, the issue was
whether Stone's action seeking an interest in copyright renewals was time-barred.
First, the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Act") states that
no cause of action under the Act can be maintained
unless it is brought "within three years after the claim
accrued."4 Declaratory Judgment is a procedural
device used to vindicate substantive rights. It is timebarred only if relief on a direct claim based on the
substantive rights is also barred.' In determining if the
plaintiff's claim is timely, a court should look at
whether the plaintiffs substantive cause of action is
barred. A cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury upon
which the claim is based.6
The court reasoned that since Stone claimed a
deprivation of a statutory entitlement, the statute of
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